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The first section of this survey examines significant decisions from U.S. courts in 2011
of interest to practitioners in the field of international commercial arbitration.' In partic-
ular, the U.S. Supreme Court held that class-action waivers in consumer arbitration
agreements are enforceable even where those waivers are unconscionable under applicable
state law. There were also several noteworthy appellate decisions addressing the alloca-
tion of claims, statute of limitations issues, and other gateway matters between arbitrators
and courts; the jurisdictional divisions between district and appellate courts; efforts to
vacate awards based on arbitrator misconduct; the status of "manifest disregard of the law"
as a ground for vacatur of arbitral awards; and the availability of discovery in aid of
arbitration.
The second section of this survey examines significant arbitration decisions from Euro-
pean courts. In one noteworthy development, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
overturned a decision of the English Court of Appeal that had held that an arbitration
clause requiring the parties to appoint members from an identified community is discrimi-
natory and thus void. In another noteworthy development, decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom and the Paris Court of Appeal reaffirmed a party's right,
under the New York Convention, to raise jurisdictional challenges to an arbitration award
at the place of enforcement and the place of arbitration, without deference to the arbitra-
tor's own conclusions on jurisdiction. Ironically, the earlier decision by the U.K. court
declined enforcement of the award based on an application of French law that the French
court eschewed only months later.
The third section of this survey looks at major developments from 2011 in the field of
investment treaty arbitration. Important jurisdictional decisions addressed the validity of
a claimant's waiver of domestic remedies before initiating arbitration, the applicability of
most-favored-nation clauses to jurisdictional prerequisites, and the power of a tribunal to
devise procedures to hear mass claims under the International Centre for Settlement of
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Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention. In awards on the merits, tribunals considered
the limits of the host state's taxation power in light of the state's obligation to protect
investment. There were also several controversial annulment decisions, which reinforced
the limited scope of review of investment treaty arbitration awards.
In other developments, the International Chamber of Commerce published a revised
version of its Rules of Arbitration, which entered into force on January 1, 2012.
I. Arbitration Developments in U.S. Courts
A. INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
1. Arbitration of Class Claims
For many years, corporate defendants facing consumer class actions in California were
often unable to enforce arbitration clauses in their agreements because the California Su-
preme Court ruled in Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles that class action waivers
in certain consumer arbitration agreements are unconscionable.? In a decision likely to
significantly enhance corporate defendants' ability to enforce arbitration provisions, the
U.S. Supreme Court held in AT&TMobility LLC v. Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) preempted the Discover Bank rule and that class-action waivers in consumer
arbitration agreements are enforceable even where such waivers are unconscionable under
the applicable state law.3
In finding the Discover Bank rule preempted by the FAA, the Supreme Court first ob-
served that section 2 of the FAA allows arbitration provisions to be "declared unenforce-
able 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,'"
including unconscionability, but not by "defenses that apply only to arbitration or that
derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue."4 The Court
further observed that the inquiry becomes "more complex when a doctrine normally
thought to be generally applicable, such as . . . unconscionability, is alleged to have been
applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration,"5 but explained that "nothing in [section 2
of the FAA] suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA's objectives."6 The Court reasoned that since the "overarch-
ing purpose of the FAA... is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements accord-
ing to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings," the Discover Bank rule, by
"requiring the availability of classwide arbitration," "interferes with fundamental attrib-
utes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."7
The Court noted that its conclusion followed from its reasoning in last year's decision
in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,s where the Court held that a party
2. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109-10 (Cal. 2005).
3. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
4. id. at 1746-47 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011)).
5. Id. at 1747.
6. Id. at 1748.
7. Id. at 1748; see also id. at 1750 ("California's Discover Bank rule... interferes with arbitration. Although
the rule does not require classwide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it ex
post.").
8. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1782 (2010).
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could not be forced to arbitrate class claims when the arbitration agreement is silent on
the issue, as the difference between bilateral and class-action arbitration is "fundamen-
tal." 9 In Conception, the Court outlined the various ways in which class arbitration elimi-
nates many of the built-in procedural advantages of bilateral arbitration and concluded
that class arbitration, "to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than con-
sensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.' 0
In light of Concepcion, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded an Eleventh Circuit
decision that had held that a class-action waiver provision in a consumer arbitration agree-
ment was substantively unconscionable and thus unenforceable under Georgia law." It
also vacated and remanded a California Supreme Court decision holding unconscionable
and thus unenforceable a pre-dispute waiver in an employment arbitration agreement of
an employee's right to a formal hearing before the state labor commissioner. 12
Various courts of appeals have been reconsidering their unconscionability jurisprudence
in light of Concepcion. The Third Circuit held that a New Jersey Supreme Court decision
finding certain class-action waivers unconscionable was preempted by the FAA.I3 And the
Second Circuit has decided sua sponte to reconsider its holding that a class-action waiver in
an arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it precluded plaintiffs from pursuing
their statutory rights under the antitrust laws.14
2. Arbitrability of Claims, Timeliness Issues, and Gateway Matters
In KPMG LLPv. Cocchi,'5 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-standing holding
that a court may not deny arbitration of certain claims on the ground that other claims are
non-arbitrable. In Cocchi, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida
upheld a trial court's refusal to compel arbitration on the ground that two out of the four
claims in the complaint were non-arbitrable without determining whether the remaining
claims were arbitrable.16 Citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), the
Supreme Court stated that the FAA "has been interpreted to require that, if a dispute
presents multiple claims, some arbitrable and some not, the former must be sent to arbi-
tration even if this will lead to piecemeal litigation." 17 The Court further explained that
from this it
follows that state and federal courts must examine with care the complaints seeking to
invoke their jurisdiction in order to separate arbitrable from non-arbitrable claims. A
court may not issue a blanket refusal to compel arbitration merely on the grounds
that some of the claims could be resolved by the court without arbitration.' s
9. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51.
10. Id.
11. Branch Banking & Trust v. Gordon, 132 S. Ct. 577 (2011).
12. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 132 S. Ct. 496,(2011).
13. Litman v. Cellco P'ship, 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2011).
14. Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., No. 06-1871-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
19851 (2d Cir. Aug. 1, 2011).
15. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25-6 (2011).
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The Court reversed and remanded, directing the Florida Court of Appeal to determine
whether either of the remaining claims was arbitrable.19
In Bechtel Do Brasil Construfaes Ltda. v. UEG Araucdria Ltda., the Second Circuit ad-
dressed whether the inclusion of a choice-of-law clause in an arbitration agreement pro-
viding that New York law would govern the "procedure and administration of any
arbitration" permitted the petitioner to invoke New York Civil Practice Law and Rule
(N.Y.C.P.L.R.) 7502(b), a provision of New York arbitration law authorizing a party to
seek judicial determination of statute-of-limitations issues. 20 Noting that the question of
contract interpretation was "a close one," the court explained that its task was to deter-
mine "whether the parties intended at the time of contracting to have issues of timeliness
determined by the arbitrator."21 The court reasoned that the parties' broad agreement to
arbitrate "any dispute ... arising out of or relating to the Contract" was in tension with
their adoption of New York law to govern the contract and the "procedure and adminis-
tration of any arbitration," rendering the contract at least ambiguous as to whether the
parties intended to refer timeliness issues to a court under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 7502(b).22 While
the court acknowledged that the choice-of-law clause could be read to adopt New York
arbitration law as a modification to the broad agreement to arbitrate, it concluded that the
contract did not compel such a reading "without doubt."23 Finding that the contract was
thus ambiguous, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), to hold that "such ambigui-
ties must be resolved in favor of arbitration."24
In Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., the Second Circuit considered whether to stay an
arbitration between Ecuador and Chevron under the United States-Ecuador Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty (BIT) based on Ecuador's claims of waiver and estoppel.25 The court
declined to rule on the merits of the motion to stay, and held that Ecuador's claims must
be determined by the arbitral tribunal since waiver and estoppel are generally considered
"gateway matters" presumptively for the arbitrators under the framework established by
the Supreme Court in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).26 The
court further explained that, even if Ecuador's waiver and estoppel claims could be consid-
ered "questions of arbitrability" that are presumptively for the court to decide under How-
sam, the parties' adoption of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Rules-Article 21 of which grants arbitrators the power to rule on their
own jurisdiction-provided "clear and unmistakable evidence" that the parties intended
these claims to be decided by the arbitral panel in the first instance. 27 Because the court
found that a stay was inappropriate, it expressly declined to consider whether it had the
power to order a stay of a BIT arbitration under the New York Convention or the FAA, a
question that remains open in the Second Circuit.28
19. Id. at 26.
20. Bechtel Do Brasil Construq6es Ltda. v. UEG Arauciria Ltda., 638 F.3d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 2011).
21. Id. at 154.
22. Id. at 156.
23. Id. at 158.
24. Id.
25. Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 391-92 (2d Cir. 2011).
26. Id. at 394.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 391.
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B. JURISDICTIONAL IsSUES UNDER THE FAA
In Johnson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.,29 the Ninth Circuit held that, even where
the parties agree to vest review of the arbitral award only with the court of appeals, a
district court may not decline to review the award as required by the FAA and enter an
order confirming that award in the expectation that review will begin in the court of ap-
peals.30 While the Ninth Circuit recognized that circuit courts have appellate jurisdiction
over final decisions of district courts even where the district court's decision not to review
the award was erroneous, it declined to review the award in the first instance.31 The court
noted that there is no statutory grant of direct appellate jurisdiction over arbitral awards
and that a court of appeals reviews an award by reviewing a district court's decision to
confirm, modify, or vacate that award. 32 The court further noted that section 9 of the
FAA, which provides that a district court "must" confirm an arbitration award unless it
decides to modify or vacate it under sections 10 and 11 of the FAA, "defeats any notion
that district courts may decline to consider motions to vacate, modify, or correct arbitra-
tion awards filed in response to a motion to confirm." 33 This requirement of the FAA
could not be altered by agreement of the parties or by the district court, which on remand
was required to apply the standard of review ordinarily mandated by the FAA.34
In Levin v. Alms & Associates, Inc., the Fourth Circuit joined the majority of U.S. appel-
late circuits in holding that an appeal on an issue of arbitrability under section 16(a)(1)(A)
of the FAA "automatically divests the district court of jurisdiction over the underlying
claims and requires a stay of the action, unless the district court certifies the appeal as
frivolous or forfeited." 3  The court reasoned that the "core subject of an arbitrability
appeal is the challenged continuation of proceedings before the district court on the un-
derlying claims."36 Therefore, because the district court lacks jurisdiction over "those
aspects of the case involved in the appeal, it must necessarily lack jurisdiction over the
continuation of any proceedings relating to the claims at issue."37 The court also adopted
the "frivolousness exception" to the divestiture of jurisdiction used in the majority of other
circuits: in the event the district court certifies the appeal as frivolous, the party alleging
arbitrability may move the court of appeals to stay the district court proceedings pending a
review of the frivolousness determination. 38
29. Johnson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 412 (9th Cir. 2011).
30. Id. at 404, 408.
31. Id. at 408-09.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 412.
34. Id. at 413.
35. Levin v. Alms & Assoc., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2011). The Third, Seventh, Tenth, and
Eleventh circuits have held that an appeal regarding arbitrability of claims does divest the district court of
jurisdiction over those claims, as long as the appeal is not frivolous. The Second and Ninth circuits have held
that no such divestiture occurs.
36. Id. at 264.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 266.
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C. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBIrRAL AwARDs
1. Efforts to Vacate an Award Related to Arbitrator Conduct
Most efforts in U.S. courts to vacate an arbitration award under FAA section 10(a) for
arbitrator non-disclosure rely on the argument that the arbitrator's failure to disclose con-
stituted "evident partiality." In STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA)
LLC, however, the Second Circuit rejected a unique claim that failure by an arbitrator to
fully disclose prior expert witness engagements-which constituted evidence of the arbi-
trator's "predisposition" on questions of law-justified vacatur as "other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced" under FAA section 10(a)(3). 39 Along
with rejecting the claim for lack of factual support, the Second Circuit also rejected its
underlying premise that an arbitrator's predisposition on legal issues can justify vacatur,
and held that the premise finds no support in the FAA or the case law.'" The Second
Circuit explained that a "judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues
in a case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice" and that "[t]his is
all the more true for arbitrators."41 The court noted that the most sought-after arbitrators
are often "prominent and experienced members of the specific business community in
which the dispute to be arbitrated arose" and that "it would be strange if such an arbitrator
were forced to search the record of all prior testimony for any statement that might-
however tangentially-relate to any of the many legal issues that might arise in any given
case."
42
In Trustmark Insurance Co. v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit held
that the district court erred in issuing an injunction that prevented parties from participat-
ing in the second arbitration of a reinsurance coverage dispute even though one member
of the second arbitration panel had been a member of the first arbitration panel. 43 While
the parties' reinsurance agreements included provisions that specified that all arbitrators
be "disinterested," the Seventh Circuit held that the term "disinterested" in the arbitration
context means "lacking a financial or other personal stake in the outcome," and that
knowledge about a dispute acquired in a prior proceeding is not a disqualifying factor.44
2. Status of "Manifest Disregard of the Law" Following Hall Street
It remains unsettled whether judicially created grounds not expressly set forth in the
FAA-including manifest disregard of the law and complete irrationality-continue to be
valid grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards following the Supreme Court's 2008 decision
in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.45 The answer will likely depend on whether "mani-
fest disregard" and "complete irrationality" are deemed extra-statutory grounds for vaca-
tur-which would call their viability into doubt-or whether they instead refer
collectively to the grounds set forth in section 10 of the FAA, or are merely shorthand for,
39. STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2011).
40. Id. at 77.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Trusunark Ins. Co. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 869, 871-72 (7th Cir. 2011).
44. Id. at 872-74.
45. Hall Street Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
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or a gloss on, FAA sections 10(a)(3)-(4), which authorize vacatur when the arbitrators are
"guilty of misconduct" or "exceed[] their powers." The Supreme Court has declined to
resolve this issue, and circuit courts remain divided.46
The Second Circuit previously affirmed the continued viability of "manifest disregard"
on the statutory "shorthand" theory, indicating that this standard is a "judicial gloss on the
specific grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA."47 But that decision
was reversed and remanded on different grounds by the Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen
SA. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. 48 A subsequent Second Circuit case acknowledged Stolt-
Nielsen's findings on manifest disregard, noting that Hall Street had placed the standard
into some doubt, but left the issue unresolved by concluding that the manifest disregard
standard had not been met.49 The Ninth5O and Sixth5l Circuits have held that "manifest
disregard" remains a viable ground for vacatur, while the Fourth52 and Tenth53 Circuits
have found that the standard is not satisfied in various cases without squarely deciding its
continued viability. In contrast, the Fifth,54 EighthS5 and Eleventh 56 Circuits have held
that it is no longer a viable ground. The First Circuit stated in dicta in one opinion that
Hall Street abolished "manifest disregard," but in a subsequent opinion vacated an award
based on the manifest disregard standard without discussing Hall Street.57 The Third Cir-
cuit has declined to reach the issue. 58
D. AvAiLALrrY OF DISCOvERY IN AID OF ARBITRATION-28 U.S.C. § 1782
The case law remains unsettled on whether evidence can be obtained in aid of an inter-
national arbitration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which authorizes district courts to
compel discovery "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."5 9 Lower
federal courts continue to be divided on whether a private international arbitral tribunal
constitutes "a foreign or international tribunal" for purposes of the statute. In In re Fin-
serve Group Ltd., the district court denied a section 1782 application and questioned
46. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768.
47. Stolt-Nielsen SA. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
48. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758.
49. T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329 (2d Cit. 2010); see also STMicroelec-
tronits, 648 F.3d at 68.
50. Comedy Club Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Lagstein v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, 607 F.3d 634 (9th Cis. 2010); Johnson, 635 F.3d at 414, n.10.
51. Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 F. App'x 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
52. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010); MCI Constructors, LLC v.
City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 2010).
53. DMA Int'l, Inc. v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 585 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 2009); Abbott v. Law Office
of Patrick J. Mulligan, No. 10-4113, 2011 WL 4375087 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011).
54. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cit. 2009).
55. Med. Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2010); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v.
Trans States Airlines, LLC, 638 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2011).
56. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010); White Springs Agric. Chems.,
Inc. v. Glawson Inv. Corp., No. 10-14532, 2011 WL 4907386 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2011).
57. Compare Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Services, 524 F.3d 120 (1st Cit. 2008), with Kashner David-
son Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2008), and Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 601 F.3d
19 (1st Cit. 2010).
58. See, e.g., Paul Green Sch. of Rock Music Franchising, LLC v. Smith, 389 F. App'x 172 (3d Cit. 2010).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1996).
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whether the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) qualified as a "foreign or
international tribunal" because it appeared to the court that there was no judicial review of
the LCIA's decisions.60 In contrast, just days earlier, the district court in In re Broadsbeet
LLC granted an application for discovery in connection with an arbitration under the
Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators without addressing whether the arbitral
tribunal qualified as a "foreign or international tribunal" for purposes of the statute.61
Lower federal courts, however, appear to have reached a consensus that arbitral tribunals
established pursuant to bilateral investment treaties do satisfy the "foreign or international
tribunal" requirement of section 1782.62
II. Arbitration Developments in European Courts
In 2011, the U.K. Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Court of Appeal deci-
sion in Jivraj v. Hasbwani.63 The Court of Appeal held that an arbitration clause under a
joint venture agreement requiring the parties to appoint as arbitrators only members from
the Ismaili community was discriminatory and thus void. The decision cast doubt on
whether widely used institutional arbitration rules that restrict the nationality of arbitra-
tors may contravene Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations 2003 (the
Regulations) and consequently invalidate arbitration agreements.
The Supreme Court held that arbitrators are not "employees" within the meaning of
the Regulations. The Court relied upon the distinction drawn by the European Court of
Justice between "those who are, in substance, employed" and "those who are independent
providers of services who are not in a relationship of subordination with the person who
receives the services." 64 The Court found that an arbitrator "is in critical respects inde-
pendent of the parties.. . [and] is in no sense in a position of subordination to the parties;
rather the contrary. He is in effect a quasi-judicial adjudicator."65
Although the Court's conclusion that arbitrators are not employees was dispositive, the
Court clarified that, for the purposes of the "genuine occupational requirement" exception
under the Regulations, the correct question to ask was whether the requirement that the
arbitrators be from the Ismaili community "was, not only genuine, but legitimate and
justified." 66 The Court held that this test was satisfied, reasoning that arbitration before
Ismaili arbitrators was "likely to involve a procedure in which the parties could have confi-
dence" and was "likely to lead to conclusions of fact in which they could have particular
60. In re Finserve Group Ltd., No. 4:11-mc-2044-RBH, 2011 WL 5024264, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2011).
61. In re Broadsheet L.L.C., No. 1 1-cv-02436-PAB-KMT, 2011 WL 4949864, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 18,
2011).
62. See, e.g., In re Chevron'Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 161 (3rd Cir. 2011); In re Republic of Ecuador, No. C l1-.
80171 CRB, 2011 WL 4434816, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011); In re Republic of Ecuador, No. 2:11-mc-
00052 GSA, 2011 WL 4089189, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011); Republic of Ecuador v. Bjorlnan, No. 11-
cv-01470-WYD-MEH, 2011 WL 3495993, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 9, 2011); Gov't of Ghana v. ProEnergy
Servs. L.L.C., No. 11-9002-MC-SOW, 2011 WIL 2652755, at *3 (W.D. Mo. June 3,2011).
63. Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40 (overturning Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2010] EWCA Civ. 712).
64. Id. 1 27.
65. Id. ' 41.
66. Id. $ 59.
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confidence" and that viewing the Court of Appeal's reasoning on this point as "too legalis-
tic and technical." 67
In late 2010 and early 2011, the U.K. Supreme Court and the Paris Court of Appeal
issued conflicting rulings on the validity of the arbitration award in Dallab Real Estate and
Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministy of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan.68 In that case,
Dallah, a provider of assistance services for pilgrims to the Muslim holy sites, asserted
claims against the government of Pakistan based on alleged contract breaches by a trust
established by Pakistani authorities and later dissolved under Pakistani law. Paris was the
place of arbitration and French law controlled whether the government of Pakistan, a
non-signatory to the contract, could be treated as a party to the arbitration agreement.
After the arbitrators rejected Pakistan's jurisdictional objection and entered an award in
Dallah's favor, Dallah sought to enforce the award in the United Kingdom. There, the
trial court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court each denied enforcement based
on their application of the French-law standard for binding non-signatories to an arbitra-
tion agreement. In its November 2010 decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that the
courts of the place where enforcement may entertain challenges under Article V(1)(a) of
the New York Convention without deference to the arbitral tribunal's contrary findings.
Once again confirming that timing is everything, less than four months later, the Paris
Court of Appeal reached a contrary result in the parallel annulment proceeding in France.
Consistent with the approach of the U.K. courts, the Court accorded no deference to the
arbitrators' decision on jurisdiction, but independently concluded that, under the relevant
French standard, Pakistan was properly a true party to the arbitration agreement.
IM. Investor-State Disputes
A. JURISDICTION
1. Invalid Waiver of Domestic Remedies
In Commerce Group Corp. v. Republic of El Salvador, an arbitral tribunal held that it lacked
jurisdiction over claims brought under the Dominican Republic-Central America Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) where claimant mining investors had impermissibly
failed to waive their domestic remedies prior to submitting their request for arbitration to
ICSID, as required by article 10.18.2(b)(ii).69 The investors had initiated proceedings
before a court in El Salvador to challenge the state's revocation of environmental permits
necessary for gold and silver mining operations, and filed their request for arbitration
while the judicial proceedings were still pending.70 The investors argued that they were
not required to discontinue pending judicial proceedings prior to submission of their
claims to arbitration and that it was the responsibility of the state to seek enforcement of
67. Id. 9170.
68. Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan,
[2010) UKSC 46, 3 W.L.R. 1472 (Nov. 3, 2010); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch.,
Feb. 17, 2011, Case No. 09/28533 (Fr.).
69. Commerce Group Corp. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Award, T 107 (Mar.
14, 2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&acionVal=
showDoc&docld=DC197 lEn&caseId=C741.
70. Id. 1 100.
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the investors' waiver. 71 The tribunal rejected this argument, embracing instead El Salva-
dor's argument that a valid waiver requires that the investor both submit its waiver and
discontinue all domestic court proceedings before initiating arbitration.72
2. Application of Most Favored Nation (MFN) Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions
In Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, Argentina objected to the arbitral tribunal's
jurisdiction because the claimant had failed to comply with the judicial recourse provision
of the Argentina-Italy BIT, which requires claimants to submit to the jurisdiction of do-
mestic courts for at least eighteen months before filing arbitration proceedings.7 3 While
recognizing that the claimant had failed to comply with this provision,74 the majority held
that-by operation of the MFN clause of the Argentina-Italy BIT-the claimant was enti-
ted to rely on the more generous dispute resolution clause of the Argentina-United
States BIT, which required only a six-month period of consultation before resorting to
arbitration. In so concluding, the majority relied on the "near-unanimity" among arbitral
tribunals in finding that broad MFN clauses apply to dispute-resolution provisions. 75
In a rare dissent, arbitrator Brigitte Stern distinguished between BIT provisions con-
cerning investors' rights and provisions concerning "the fundamental conditions for access
to the rights," and explained that an MFN clause should only apply to the former.76 In
Stem's view, the judicial recourse provision of the Argentina-Italy BIT constituted a con-
dition on Argentina's consent to arbitrate and thus a condition on an investor's access to
arbitration. Noting that "consent is the cornerstone of ICSID arbitration,"77 Stem ex-
plained that a state's conditional offer to arbitrate "cannot magically be transformed into
an unconditional right by the grace of the MFN clause." 78 Accordingly, Stem would have
held that the Argentina-United States BIT provided no separate basis for jurisdiction. 79
3. Jurisdiction over Mass Claims
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent emphasis in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion on the ten-
sion between class claims and arbitration contrasts starkly with Abaclat and Others v. the
Argentine Republic (formerly Giovanna a Beccara and Others v. the Argentine Republic), where
an ICSID tribunal concluded that it could hear a claim initiated by a large class of claim-
ants despite the ICSID Convention's and the relevant BIT's silence on the issue.8 0 The
71. Id. 73-75.
72. Id. 80.
73. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award (June 21, 2011), available
at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC
217 lEn&caseId=C 109.
74. Id. T 94.
75, Id. T 108.
76. Impregilo, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Prof. Brigitte Stern, 1
47.
77. Id. 9 89.
78. Id. 199.
79. Id. 91 109.
80. Aclabat & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Aug.4, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docld=DC1390_En&caseld=C95 [hereinafter Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility].
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tribunal in Abaclat found that it had jurisdiction to hear the consolidated claims of approx-
imately 60,000 Italian citizens who had invested in sovereign bonds on which Argentina
defaulted. The tribunal considered the procedural changes necessary to accommodate a
large group of claimants and concluded that they "relate strictly to the manner of con-
ducting the [] proceedings" and "do not affect the object of [its] examination."8' The
tribunal also addressed the consequences of refusing to hear the consolidated claims and
concluded that it could "equal a denial of justice," as it would be "cost prohibitive for
many Claimants to file individual claims" and "practically impossible for ICSID to deal
separately with 60,000 individual arbitrations." 82 The tribunal thus concluded that noth-
ing in the ICSID Convention or the Italy-Argentina BIT prohibited arbitration of a "mass
claim," regardless of whether the respondent had specifically consented to such arbitra-
tion.8 3 The tribunal also determined that the claimants' security entitlements in Argen-
tina's sovereign bonds constituted an "investment" covered by the ICSID Convention and
the BIT even though the bonds were purchased on the secondary market.8 4
In a strongly worded dissent, arbitrator Georges Abi-Saab disagreed with the majority
on both issues.8 5 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions in Stolt-Nielsen and
Concepcion, Abi-Saab found that the tribunal had no jurisdiction over the mass claim absent
Argentina's consent and argued that the tribunal could not presume consent from the
silence of the BIT and the ICSID Convention8 6 in light of the "fundamental differences"
in procedure between bilateral and mass claim arbitration.8 7 Abi-Saab further rejected the
majority's conclusion that the tribunal possessed the authority to devise new procedures
for the arbitration; according to the dissent, the majority had far exceeded its limited
mandate to "fill gaps" under article 44 of the ICSID Convention by substantially modify-
ing the existing ICSID Rules,88 and the proposed procedural modifications would deprive
Argentina of its due process right to challenge each claimant's allegations.8 9 Abi-Saab also
dissented from the majority's decision on jurisdiction, reasoning that the claimants' invest-
ments in sovereign bonds fell outside the scope of covered "investments" under the ICSID
Convention or the Italy-Argentina BIT, because there was no territorial link between the
investments and Argentina. 9°
81. Id. 9 533-34.
82. Id. 537.
83. Id. 9 480-92.
84. Id. 9 372-78, 387. The majority explained that "security entitlements are the result of the distribution
process of the bonds through their division into a multitude of smaller securities representing each a part of
the value of the relevant bond" and that they had no value independently of the bond. The majority thus
treated the sovereign bonds and the claimants' security entitlements in those bonds as "part of one and the
same economic operation." Id. 99 358-59.
85. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Georges Abi-Saab [hereinafter
Dissenting Opinion of Professor Georges Abi-Saab].
86. Id. 177, 190.
87. Id. 150-53, 171-74; see Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 80.
88. Dissenting Opinion of Professor Georges Abi-Saab, supra note 85, 9 210-13.
89. Id. 242-44.
90. See generally id. 9 101-19 (distinguishing cases).
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B. DECISIONS ON THE MERITS
1. Fair and Equitable Treatment
In Sergei Pausbok v. Government of Mongolia, a tribunal held that a windfall profit tax on
sales of gold by mining companies operating in Mongolia was not a breach of Mongolia's
fair and equitable treatment obligations, even though it constituted a "radical change" in
the state's taxation regime and was widely considered "ill-conceived, counter-productive
and generally excessive." 91 The investor who initiated arbitration under the Russian Fed-
eration-Mongolia BIT to challenge the tax argued, among other things, that the tax vio-
lated the BIT's fair and equitable treatment standard by frustrating the investor's
legitimate expectations, lacking transparency in its enactment and enforcement, and alter-
ing the predictability of the business and legal environment 2 The tribunal rejected each
argument, observing that, unless the investor had entered into an agreement with
Mongolia that limited or prohibited the possibility of tax increases, it "should not be sur-
prised to be hit with tax increases in subsequent years," as such an event "could not be
considered [...1 'unpredictable.'" 93 The tribunal's reasoning suggested that the standard
for a state's breach of its fair and equitable treatment obligations may be heightened
where the challenge relates to the rights of taxation, "in respect of which States jealously
guard their sovereign powers."94
2. Expropriation
In Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, a tribunal held that the Peruvian tax authority
indirectly expropriated a Chinese investor's investment in a Peruvian company by impos-
ing interim measures that froze the company's assets and substantially impacted its ability
to conduct business.95 While the investor alleged that the authority expropriated its in-
vestment in the company both through a tax audit and through subsequent imposition of
interim measures, the tribunal found that the tax audit was routine and did not constitute
expropriation.96 In contrast, the tribunal found that the interim measures were arbitrary
and not in compliance with the tax authority's own internal guidelines and procedures.97
Notably, the tribunal awarded only book-value damages to the investor, taking into con-
sideration that the company had negative cash flow, that it was highly leveraged in a high-
risk industry, and that its competitive position had begun to worsen at the time the in-
terim measures were imposed.98
91. Paushok v. Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, UNCITRAL, 9 299, 305 (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf.
92. Id. 9 301-05.
93. Id. 305.
94. Id. 310.
95. Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Award (uly 7, 2011).
96. Id. 9 95, 103, 113.
97. Id. 9 171-217.
98. Id. 19 261-73.
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C. DAMAGES AND COSTS
This year, several tribunals issued damages awards that shed fight on the measure and
calculation of damages in investment treaty arbitration. In Lenire v. Ukraine, an ICSID
tribunal rendered an award on damages owed to a foreign investor for Ukraine's breaches
of its fair and equitable treatment obligations under the United States-Ukraine BIT.99
The tribunal adopted an expansive view of the claimant's compensable investment, con-
sidering not only his cash contributions but also his "risk-taking, personal commitment,
and the essential contribution of a path-breaker," noting that "[t]ransitional economies
need [investors such as claimant], who take considerable risks and commit themselves with
great energy, notwithstanding the absence of clear recovery horizons." 100 While the Le-
mire tribunal rejected the investor's request for moral damages, it articulated a standard
for those "exceptional cases" in which moral damages may be available to an investor.' 0
Specifically, the tribunal held that moral damages may be available where (i) the host
state's actions imply physical threat, illegal detention, or other analogous situations in
which the ill treatment contravenes the norms according to which civilized nations are
expected to act; (ii) the host state's actions cause stress, anxiety, deterioration of health, or
mental suffering such as humiliation, shame and degradation, or loss of reputation, credit,
and social position; and (iii) both the cause of the injury and its effects are grave and
substantial, as in the case of the use of force by the host state. 102
After previously determining that Ecuador was liable for hundreds of millions of dollars
in direct damages and pre-judgment interest due to egregious delays by its courts in adju-
dicating claimant's lawsuits, an ad hoc UNCITRAL tribunal in Chevron Corp. v. Republic of
Ecuador issued its final award on damages, ruling that the damages award was subject to
taxation under Ecuadorian law.' 03 Specifically, the tribunal held that claimant's direct
damages and pre-judgment interest award was subject to Ecuador's 87.31% "unified
tax,"104 and that the award of pre-judgment interest was also subject to Ecuador's 25%
income tax. 105 Ecuador's very high tax rate and the tribunal's decision to recognize it
reinforces the need for claimants and their counsel to evaluate potential damages in light
of the host state's tax laws.
After making awards on damages, the Lemire and Chevron tribunals considered the allo-
cation of costs between the parties. Both tribunals acknowledged a recent trend in invest-
ment arbitration jurisprudence toward the allocation of costs to the losing party and chose
to follow that approach.106 The reasoning of the two tribunals, however, reflects the diffi-
culties in determining the prevailing party in complex arbitral proceedings. In Lemire, the
tribunal held that the investor was the "overall winning party" but decided to award him
only a portion of his costs on the ground that the investor had not completely prevailed on
99. Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Award (Mar. 28, 2011).
100. Id. 9 303, 306.
101. Id. 1% 333, 344.
102. Id. 1 333 (citing Desert Line Projects LLC v. Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17 9 166, 185-86,
286 (Feb. 6, 2008)).
103. Chevron v. Ecuador, Final Award, UNCITRAL, 87 (Aug. 31, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/
ChevronEcuadorFinalAward.pdf.
104. Id. 9 314, 348.
105. Id. I9 337, 348.
106. Lemire, 380; Chevron, 375.
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a single disputed issue in the arbitration and had abandoned a number of the claims he
initially submitted. 107 In contrast, the tribunal in Chevron found that the claimants were
largely successful in the jurisdiction and liability phases of the arbitration but that the
respondent was mostly successful in the damages phaselOs The tribunal thus divided the
arbitrators' costs evenly between the parties and required that each party pay its own costs
and fees.
D. ANNuLMENr OF ARBITRATION AwARDs
This year, ICSID ad hoc annulment committees rejected requests for annulment in
several high profile cases, reinforcing the narrow standard of review for annulment of
ICSID arbitration awards. In Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. I, Ltd. v.
Republic of Peru, Peru sought annulment of the tribunal's decisions on jurisdiction and the
merits partly on the ground that the tribunal had failed to apply the Peruvian Civil Code
in determining the scope of its jurisdiction and had refused to cross-examine Peru's dam-
ages expert, thus depriving Peru of its right to be heard.'0 9 The committee noted that the
tribunal had considered both international law and Peru's foreign investment law in decid-
ing its jurisdiction and held that the committee did not have the power to reevaluate
which provisions of Peruvian law might be relevant to the tribunal's determination of its
jurisdiction.) 10 Moreover, the committee held that an ICSID tribunal is not obliged to
hear from all witnesses orally and the tribunal was within its rights to reject the findings of
Peru's damages expert without cross-examination." I
In the long-awaited decision on annulment in Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Re-
public, rendered under the United States-Argentina BIT, the ad hoc annulment committee
rejected applications for partial annulment of the award submitted both by the investor
and the host State. 1 2 The investor challenged the merits of the award partly on the basis
that the tribunal had failed to apply governing law by not addressing Argentina's continu-
ing refusal to honor its debt obligations following the termination of the emergency pe-
riod resulting from the country's economic crisis."l 3 While the committee found that the
tribunal did not expressly discuss the continued effect of Argentina's measures, it con-
cluded that the tribunal's award implicitly determined that the investment treaty "did not
apply to the continuing consequences of those measures even after the end of the eco-
nomic crisis." 1I4 Argentina, in turn, sought partial annulment of the award on the ground
that the tribunal failed to state reasons for its dismissal of Argentina's invocation of the
107. Lemire, 9 380-83.
108. Chevron, 11 374-76.
109. Duke Energy Int'l Peru Invs. No. 1, Ltd. v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28, Decision of the Ad Hoc




112. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on the Application for Partial
Annulment of Continental Casualty Company and the Application for Partial Annulment of the Argentine
Republic (Sept. 16, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&docld=DC229 lEn&caseld=C13.
113. Id. 91 105, 108.
114. Id. T 126.
VOL. 46, NO. 1
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 127
BIT's emergency provisions.' 15 While the committee acknowledged that the tribunal ad-
dressed that specific issue in a mere two paragraphs of the award, it rejected Argentina's
argument and stated that, "(tihe fact that reasons may have been short is not in the Com-
mittee's view a meaningful criterion for determining whether the discussion offered by a
tribunal falls short of its duty to state reasons."1 16
IV. Other Developments
In 2011, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), one of the world's leading
providers of institutional arbitration services to international commercial parties, pub-
lished a revised version of its Rules of Arbitration (the 2012 Rules). The 2012 Rules went
into effect on January 1, 2012, and apply to any ICC proceedings commenced on or fol-
lowing that date." 7 The 2012 Rules include numerous additions and modifications in-
tended to enhance the speed and cost-effectiveness of ICC arbitration while preserving
the principle of party autonomy and ensuring transparency, efficiency, and fairness in the
dispute resolution process. Among other changes, the 2012 Rules include new provisions
designed to provide procedural standards for complex arbitrations involving multiple par-
ties or multiple contracts; supplement arbitrator disclosure requirements; enhance case-
management procedures; provide for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator to order
urgent interim measures; and expand the scope of the Rules to facilitate the handling of
disputes arising under investment treaties and free-trade agreements.
115. Id. 235.
116. Id. 261.
117. Dispute Resolution Rules, International Chamber of Commerce, http://www.iccwbo.org/ICCDRSRules/
(last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
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